Crisis in Context: The End of the Late Bronze Age in the Eastern Mediterranean

January 2016 (120.1)

Forum

Crisis in Context: The End of the Late Bronze Age in the Eastern Mediterranean

Explanations for the Late Bronze Age crisis and collapse in the eastern Mediterranean are legion: migrations, predations by external forces, political struggles within dominant polities or system collapse among them, inequalities between centers and peripheries, climatic change and natural disasters, disease/plague. There has never been any overarching explanation to account for all the changes within and beyond the eastern Mediterranean, some of which occurred at different times from the mid to late 13th throughout the 12th centuries B.C.E. The ambiguity of the evidence—material, textual, climatic, chronological—and the differing contexts involved across the central-eastern Mediterranean make it difficult to disentangle background noise from boundary conditions and to distinguish cause from effect. Can we identify the protagonists of the crisis and related events? How useful are recent explanations that focus on climate and/or chronology in providing a better understanding of the crisis? This article reviews the current state of the archaeological and historical evidence and considers the coherence of climatic explanations and overprecise chronologies in attempting to place the “crisis” in context. There is no final solution: the human-induced Late Bronze Age “collapse” presents multiple material, social, and cultural realities that demand continuing, and collaborative, archaeological, historical, and scientific attention and interpretation.

By A. Bernard Knapp and Sturt W. Manning

American Journal of Archaeology Vol. 120, No. 1 (January 2016), pp. 99–149

DOI: 10.3764/aja.120.1.0099

Comments

Unfortunately, this is yet

Unfortunately, this is yet another paper which entirely ignores the most important part of archaeological evidence relevant to the subject, namely settlement patterns, settlement changes and relocation of habitation sites, which took place in the coastal regions of the east Mediterranean, around the time of the 1200 BC collapse. So, I fully support V.Karageorghis' advice to consider first archaeological evidence before moving to theoretical concepts. The environmental, social, economic, etc explanations should be in line with archaeological evidence, and certainly they cannot be in conflict. Please, please, please look at the dramatic change of settlement patterns in the South Aegean if you want to understand the historical background of Maa Palaeokastro and Pyla Kokkinokremos and somewhat later events in the Levant.

Unfortunately, indeed, this

Unfortunately, indeed, this first reply on the AJA forum nicely highlights some of the key challenges in the wider field, and shows how – despite well-known papers in this journal over the past 35 years by, amongst others, Renfrew (1980) and Snodgrass (1985) – the intellectual rigour embraced by much of world archaeology over the past half century is still often lacking in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. Nowicki says we should “consider first archaeological evidence before moving to theoretical concepts”, whereas we believe that data cannot be considered without theory. As elucidated in work over the past 50 years, the archaeological ‘data’ we may recover and the interpretations we can offer from our engagement with these data are theory-based, derived and informed (e.g. Shanks and Tilley 1987, Social Theory and Archaeology; Hodder 2012, Entangled). What Nowicki implies, of course, is that he wants archaeologists to take one specific, narrow and outmoded theoretical perspective – but not explicitly – and use this rather than question, explore and critique both data and theory, and consider holistically plausible interpretations. If we examine the first page (p. 435) of Nowicki’s 2011 paper in The “Dark Age” Revisited volume, he perfectly exemplifies this narrow theoretical position, with statements such as “The ‘1200 B.C. collapse’ is a historical fact”, and “At present, it is generally accepted that the new settlement pattern resulted from insecurity that followed the collapse of the Mycenaean states”. Each statement non-explicitly assumes a single narrative and entirely ignores the rich complexities surrounding each statement and the wider topic. Even within Aegean prehistory, other scholars, not least Dickinson (2006, The Aegean from Bronze Age to Iron Age), strongly disagree with the literalism, purported granularity and historical particularism asserted by Nowicki. This sort of scholarly model is inadequate.

In contrast our AJA paper attempts partially (we state in our text we cannot do justice to all topics and data) to contextualize the topic of the Late Bronze Age ‘collapse’, to explore the methodology relevant to this wider topic, and thus to critique data, theory and approaches employed in scholarship to date. We do not find a single or clear answer, and that is the point of the paper. We believe that the field has moved beyond the limited vision encapsulated in Nowicki’s comment. His approach demands that we focus only on the trees, rather than on the forests that contain and contextualize them. He thus does exactly as one reviewer of our paper warned would occur: “One will find fault with one part of it or another —especially any number of individual and diverse contexts and contextual details that have somehow been combined and conspire to form the threads of the historian's tapestry of ‘collapse’.” But such a narrow view will never enlighten the larger topic. Nowicki’s one critical observation was that we did not engage adequately with Crete or the Aegean: does this somehow undermine the remaining 98% of the paper, engaging many other areas and themes? We already acknowledged (p. 123): “The archaeological case is even more complex, and it impossible in a study such as this to do justice to the widespread and always-increasing archaeological record.” We, as well as the readers of this Forum, would be grateful if Nowicki would enlighten us, at least briefly, on how he thinks “dramatic” changes in south Aegean settlement patterns could help us to understand the “historical background” of Cypriot sites and “somewhat later events” in the Levant. And, once again, and finally, on “theoretical concepts”: as we emphasized (pp. 134-135): “… we can best advance research and knowledge in archaeology, on Cyprus and elsewhere, by dissolving this artificial separation between data, methodology and theory. Instead, we should look to common ground where theory interacts with and is in¬fused by data, thus no longer separating the “what” from the “how” of material things.” In our view, this paper engages theoretical concepts only in passing: it is essentially a methodological paper, or at least one that seeks to critique some of the prominent methodologies that have dominated the recent literature on the end of the Late Bronze Age in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean.

After some interval for "the

After some interval for "the silent night" mood I can return to this now. When reading Bernard Knapp's response I was surprised to find that my short comment provoked such a serious reaction that went far beyond my very specific remark. That was not my intention. I made ONE (in my opinion a very important one) comment on ONE weak point of the paper (though worth more than 2% allocated by Knapp), but I did not want to get involved in another endless/hopeless discussion about the superiority of theoretical approaches over the data collection and data analysis. It must have been my fault, however, that I did not express my criticism (which was not "a limited vision encapsulated in my comment") in a more clear way, so, here I will try to do it better, though it will take much more space.
First, Knapp pointed out that "DATA can not be considered without THEORY", but I have never questioned that. I do question, however, the common case (much too common!) when THEORY is pushed forwards without any consideration of DATA, or when the starting point for THEORY is based on extremely poor or wrongly published evidence. I do not understand, therefore, why Knapp regards the opinion that "we should consider first archaeological evidence before moving to theoretical concepts”, as wrong, and in conflict with his position "that data cannot be considered without theory". It brings much worse results when theory is considered without data. My position is that whatever theoretical model is applied in archaeological research, it must not be in disagreement with archaeological (sometimes textual) evidence. On page 134, Knapp and Manning propose/encourage the archaeologists who want to "advance research and knowledge in archaeology, on Cyprus and elsewhere, by dissolving this artificial separation between data, methodology, and theory. Instead, we should look to common ground where theory interacts with and is infused by data..." So, my question was, why the authors completely ignored the data concerning the dramatic changes in settlement pattern in the south Aegean, the problem which is more relevant to the explanation of the processes observed around the same time in Cyprus, than other cases/problems which got much more space in their paper? It is the Authors' claim, and not my demand that "this article reviews the current state of archeological and historical evidence..." (the abstract) and "the present study aims to present more expository, up-to date treatments of the archaeological data and historical evidence..." and again "this article reviews the current state of archaeological and historical evidence..." (p. 100). I have found these claims at least not entirely fulfilled, certainly not in the respect of settlement changes in the insular regions of the East Mediterranean. Farther on, the Authors write that they "can only attempt to summarize some of the more relevant instances of destructions and abandonments that took place throughout the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean in the period between ca. 1250 and 1150 B.C.E." (p. 123). Do Knapp and Manning regard the changes in the Mainland, where they give a number of site names and references, as more relevant to the subject than the better understood contemporary changes in Crete? Does Kanta 1980, indeed, represent "up-to-date" reference to the problem of settlement collapse in the south Aegean? Perhaps Wallace 2010 is worth of looking at, as well? Is Crete so poorly researched that it was not worth of including the island into the frame labeled "Greece" (?) showing the regions discussed in the paper (Fig. 7 on page 124)?
Knapp, in his above response, wrote that Nowicki wants "archaeologists to take one specific, narrow, and outmoded theoretical perspective.... and use this rather than question, explore and critique both data and theory". No, that is not true. Actually, what I have been doing for the last 30+ years was continuous questioning, searching for, and analysing data in their wide geographical and chronological contexts, to propose the most plausible explanation and historical reconstruction of the past. Here, however, I have to clarify another misunderstanding, that regarding the meaning of the term "history" and "historical", which Knapp calls "narrow" or "outmoded". I have often had impression that some of theoretically orientated scholars regard history and historical interpretation as something narrow-minded, old-fashioned, not to say academically primitive. If I understand Knapp's criticism properly, history cannot explain "rich complexities". So what history is about to Knapp and some other scholars? Certainly not the same as it is to me. Yes, indeed, I wrote (in my paper of 2011) that "the 1200 B.C. collapse is a historical fact", and this statement was strongly criticized by Knapp. But why? It seems that there was, or still is, a very different understanding of what this term (history) meant in different parts of the world. In my schools (primary, high and university), history was never "events, dates, names", (e.g. the battle of Hastings, 1066, William the Conqueror) - this was only a very small part of our history courses. Much more time we spent learning about social, political, and economic processes (their causes, results, side effects, etc.), cultural issues, science, art and other. Perhaps it was one of a few advantages of the educational system in East Europe, at least the Marxist (and not only) theories were poured into us in our young years. Historical (opposite to fictional) has been always for me the complete (as much as evidence allows) reconstruction of the past and not as Knapp suggests narrow-minded and outmoded. I wish there was more attention paid in theoretically orientated works to the proper understanding of the term "history" and "historical".
However, let us come back to the problem which I spotted in Knapp and Manning's paper - the discrepancy between the Authors claims and the reality regarding the most relevant and updated data which can better explain the settlement changes in Cyprus, and to some degree on the Levantine coast, than those discussed in the paper. As far as I am aware, Vassos Karageorghis was the only scholar, dealing with the problem of the 1200 BC collapse on Cyprus, who understood the value of the settlement changes and the phenomenon of defensive settlements in Crete, for the broader interpretation of processes which led to substantial changes in the regions east of Crete (and visited several sites of this kind in Crete). I still remember the vivid discussion during the closing session of the conference co-organized by Karageorghis in Dublin in 1999. The conference which was the first to bring together Cyprus, the Levant and the Aegean during the collapse time. And I remember that in Dublin Knapp was not convinced at all by a number of conclusions proposed by the speakers. After 15 years it is obvious, that nothing has changed since then, even worse, the well researched changes of settlement in Crete appeared to be irrelevant to the problems presented in the article, and curiously the only single Cretan site mentioned by name is Agia Triada (I could not find out what was the relevance of this reference to the subject!?) though dozens of others in the mainland, Anatolia, Cyprus and the Levant are worth of that. Knapp writes that every paper must be selective, but I could not understand what was the key for the selection in this paper. I think that for the understanding of the phenomenon of abandonments, destructions and foundation of new defensible/defensive settlements in the coastal regions of the East Mediterranean, the sites on Crete, such as Zakros Gorge Kato Kastellas, Kastrokefala Almyrou, Elias to Nisi, Palaikastro Kastri, Kolokasia Kastri, Kritsa Kastello, Arvi Fortetsa and many other, missed from the discussion, are more relevant than the sites of Korakou, Dimini, Nichoria, Tzoungiza and other mainland sites which, on the other hand, the Authors regarded worth of mentioning by names and references.
Knapp, in his response, writes "Even within Aegean prehistory, other scholars, not least Dickinson (2006, The Aegean from Bronze Age to Iron Age), strongly disagree with the literalism, purported granularity and historical particularism asserted by Nowicki. This sort of scholarly model is inadequate". So, I would like to clarify what exactly Dickinson disagree on, and why? I expressed my objections to Dickinson criticism in my 2011 paper, cited in Knapp's response. There is no point to repeat all my arguments here. In short, therefore, the two most important points among my objections: 1) Dickinson criticized the interpretation of settlement changes in Crete, the explanation for the abandonments, destructions and relocations, divided into several phases, and put in the wider East Mediterranean contemporary context, and 2) Dickinson questioned the dating of the sites discussed by me in this context. Knapp prizes Dickinson's open-minded criticism of my interpretation and sites' dating. But why Dickinson, regarding Crete, is right and I am wrong? What was Dickinson statement based on? I do not want to neglect Dickinson's expertise in many aspects of the Aegean archaeology, but certainly he is not the authority on the settlement history in Crete and on the dating of the surface material from the newly identified settlements in Crete dated to the period in question, something he has never found, he has never seen, he has never studied. The basis for my conclusion were100+ sites dated to the period in question. All of them were visited, revisited, re-revisited, studied together with their hinterland, analysed with their environment and together with the local and regional landscape. Tens of thousands of pottery fragments were studied in situ (or in the museums), drew and photographed. All that was joint together and confronted with the similar phenomena around Crete. And all this work was negatively "evaluated" by Dickinson in a few sentences. The most curious among Dickinson's criticisms was that the dates proposed for these sites were "debatable" and the interpretation was simplified. But I would like to ask, how many of these 100+ sites were visited (not to ask studied) by Dickinson ? - I guess fewer than five ; how many of those pottery fragments questioned by Dickinson were seen by him ? - I guess none. Here, I would like to take Knapp's remark on "trees versus a forest". Indeed, Dickinson's approach in his criticism of the phenomenon of the settlement collapse and relocation can be compared to somebody neglecting the existence of the forest who never came close to the area where the forest grows, and additionally questioning the identification of trees not seeing, touching and studying them. No, I cannot agree with Knapp that I was not interested in a forest, just looking at the trees only. By studying carefully individual trees, I tried to understand the forest. After all, a forest without trees is not the forest any more. Is this sort of scholarship adequate (versus my interpretation of the phenomenon in the book of 2000 which is inadequate) - as is suggested by Knapp?
To sum up, I repeat my first comment: Knapp and Manning completely ignored in their paper the whole group of evidence, concerning settlement changes around 1200 BC in the south Aegean, which is very important and very relevant to the problem of settlement changes in the East Mediterranean. Although this evidence cannot give the answer what caused the geographically wide-spread crisis, it can enlighten the direct causes for the settlement collapse, the character of these changes, and can allow us to see the changes in their complex historic sequence. Certainly, the changes in the south Aegean were very relevant to similar (but not the same) changes in Cyprus and the Levant.
I suppose that my arguments will not change the Authors' attitude to the problem of the coexistence of THEORY and DATA. I can propose, therefore the Authors, both or one (Oliver Dickinson is also warmly welcome) to visit 10 to 15 sites in Crete, which represent the most dramatic phase of collapse and in my opinion represent the phenomenon very relevant to the decades lasting discussion on the 1200 BC collapse. The tour may be a bit tiring (the roads end sometimes far from the target and the slopes can be steep occasionally), but that seems to be a much better way of sorting out academic disagreements.

That is almost all of my comments..... there is only one point to add. I wish to everyone, including narrow-minded archaeological evidence "collectors" , "historical" interpreters, and theoretical "high flyers" a Very Happy New Year.

When reading Bernard Knapp's

When reading Bernard Knapp's response I was surprised to find that my short comment provoked such a serious reaction that went far beyond my very specific remark. That was not my intention. I made ONE (in my opinion a very important one) comment on ONE weak point of the paper (though more that 2% allocated by Knapp), but I did not want to get involved in another endless/hopeless discussion about the superiority of theoretical approaches over the data collection and data analysis. It must have been my fault, however, that I did not express my criticism (which was not "a limited vision encapsulated in my comment") in a more clear way, so here I will try to do it better, though it will take much more space.
First, Knapp pointed out that "DATA cannot be considered without THEORY", but I have never questioned that. I do question, however, the common case (much too common) when THEORY is pushed forwards without any consideration of DATA, or when the starting point for THEORY is based on extremely poor or wrongly published evidence. I do not understand, therefore, Knapp regards the opinion that "we should consider first archaeological evidence before moving to theoretical concepts", as wrong, and in conflict with his position "the data cannot be considered without theory". Can THEORY, therefore be considered without DATA? On page 134, Knapp and Manning propose/encourage the archaeologists who want to "advance research and knowledge in archaeology on Cyprus and elsewhere, by dissolving this artificial separation between data, methodology, and theory. Instead, we should look to common ground where theory interacts with and is infused by data...". My question is, therefore, why the Authors completely ignored the data concerning the dramatic changes in settlement pattern in the south Aegean, the problem which is more relevant to the explanation of the processes observed around the same ime in Cyprus, than other cases/problems which got much more space in their paper? It is the Authors claim that "this article reviews the current state of archaeological and historical evidence..." (the abstract) and "the present study aims to present more expository, up-to date treatments of the archaeological data and historical evidence..." and again "this article reviews the current state of archaeological and historical evidence..." (page 100). I have found these claims at least not entirely fulfilled, certainly not in respect of settlement changes in the insular regions of the East Mediterranean. Farther on, the Authors write that they "can only attempt to summarize some of the more relevant instances of destructions and abandonments that took place throughout the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean in the period between ca. 1250 and 1150 B.C.E" (p. 123). Do Knapp and Manning regard the changes in the mainland, where they give a number of site names and references, more relevant to the subject than the better understood contemporary changes in Crete? Does Kanta 1980, indeed represent "up-to-date" reference to the problem of settlement collapse in the south Aegean? Perhaps Wallace 2010 is worth of looking at, as well? Is Crete so poorly researched that it does not deserve to be included into the frame labeled "Greece" (?) showing the regions discussed in the paper (Fig. 7 on page 124)?
Knapp, in his response, wrote that Nowicki wants "archaeologists to take one specific, narrow, and outmoded theoretical perspective... and use this rather than question, explore, and critique both data and theory". No, that is not true. Actually, what I have been doing for the last 30+ years was continuous questioning, searching for, and analysing data in their wide geographical and chronological contexts, to propose the most plausible explanation and historical reconstruction of the past. Here, however, I have to clarify another misunderstanding, regarding the meaning of the term "history" and "historical", which Knapp calls "narrow" or "outmoded". have often had impression that some of theoretically orientated scholars regard history and historical interpretation as something narrow-minded, old-fashioned, not to say academically primitive. If I understand Knapp's criticism properly, history cannot explain "rich complexities". So what history is about to Knapp and some other scholars? Certainly not the same as it is to me. It seems that there was, or still is, a very different understanding of what this term (history) meant in different parts of the world. In my schools (primary, high, university), history was never events, dates and names - this was only a very small part of our history courses. Much more time we spent learning about social, political and economic processes (their causes, results, side effects, etc.), cultural issues, science, art and others. Perhaps it was one of a few advantages of the educational system in East Europe, at least the Marxist (and not only) THEORIES were poured into us in our young years. Historical (opposite to fictional) has always been for me the complete (as much as evidence allows) reconstruction of the past. I wish, there was more attention paid in theoretical orientated works to the proper understanding of the term "history" and "historical".
However, I would like to come back to the very problem which I spotted in Knapp and Manning's paper - the discrepancy between the Authors claims and the reality regarding the most relevant and updated data which can better explain the settlement changes in Cyprus, and to some degree on the Lavantine coast, than those discussed in the paper. As far as I am aware, Vassos Karageorghis was the only scholar, dealing with the problem of the 1200 BC collapse on Cyprus, who understood the value of the settlement changes in Crete for the broader interpretation of processes which led to substantial changes in the regions east of Crete (and he visited several sites of this kind in Crete). I still remember the vivid discussion during the closing session of the conference co-organized by Karageorghis in Dublin, in 1999. The conference which was the first to bring together Cyprus, the Levant and the Aegean during the time of the collapse. And I remember that in Dublin Knapp was not convinced at all by a number of conclusions proposed by the speakers. After 15 years it is obvious that nothing has changed, and even worse, the well researched changes of settlement in Crete appeared to be irrelevant to the problem presented in this article. Curiously, the only single Cretan site mentioned by name is Agia Triada (I could not find out what was the relevance of this reference to the subject?!) though dozens of others in the mainland, Anatolia, Cyprus and the Levant were worth of that. Knapp writes that every paper must be selective, but I could not understand what was the key for the selection in this paper. I think that for the understanding of the phenomenon of abandonments, destructions and foundations of new defensible/defensive settlements in the coastal regions of the east Mediterranean, the sites on Crete, such as Zakros Gorge Kato Kastellas, Kastrokefala Almyrou, Elias to Nisi, Palaikastro Kastri, Kolokasia Kastri, Kritsa Kastello, Arvi Fortetsa, and many others, missed from the discussion, are more relevant than the sites of Korakou, Dimini, Nichoria, Tzoungisa and other mainland sites named and referred to by the Authors.
Knapp, in his response, writes "Even within Aegean prehistory, other scholars, not least Dickinson (2006, The Aegean from Bronze to Iron Age), strongly disagree with the literalism, purpoted granularity and historical particularism asserted by Nowicki. This sor of schoraly model is inadequate". So, I would like to clarify what exactly Dickinson disagreed on and why? I expressed my objections to Dickinson criticism in my 2011 paper, cited in Knapp's response, here therefore I will repeat only two the most important of them: 1) Dickinson criticized the interpretation of settlement changes in Crete, the explanation for the abandonments, destructions and relocations in the wider east Mediterranean context, and 2) Dickinson questioned the dating of the sites discussed by me in this context. Knapp prizes Dickinson's open-minded criticism of my interpretation and site's dating. But why Dickinson, regarding Crete is right and I am wrong? I do not want to neglect Dickinson expertise on many aspects of the Aegean archaeology, but certainly he is not the authority on the settlement history in Crete and on dating of the surface material from newly identified sites in Crete from the period in question. The basis for my conclusions were 100+ sites dated to the period in question. All of them were visited, revisited, re-revisited, studied together with their hinterland, analysed with their environment and together with the local or regional landscape. Tens of thousands of pottery fragments were analysed for their dating. And all this work was negatively "evaluated" by Dickinson in a few sentences. But I would like to ask, how many of these 100+ sites were visited (not to ask studied) by Dickinson, how many of those pottery fragments questioned by Dickinosn were seen by him? Here, I would like to take Knapp's remark on "trees versus a forest". Can we understand the forest not paying attention to trees? I cannot agree with Knapp that I was not interested in a forest, just looking at the trees only. By studying carefully individual trees, I tried to understand the forest. After all, a forest without trees is not the forest any more. Is this scholarship inadequate - as is suggested by Knapp?
To sum up, I repeat my first comment: Knapp and Manning ignored in their paper the whole group of evidence, concerning settlement changes around 1200 BC in the south Aegean, which is very important and very relevant to the problem of settlement changes in the east Mediterranean. Although this evidence cannot give the answer what caused the geographically wide-spread crisis, it can enlighten the direct causes for the settlement collapse, the character of these changes, and can allow us to see the changes in their complex historic sequence. Certainly, the changes in the south Aegean were very relevant to similar (but not identical) changes in Cyprus and in the coastal Levant.
I suppose that my arguments will not change the Authors' attitude to the problem of the coexistence of THEORY and DATA. I can propose therefore the Authors, both or one (Oliver Dickinson is also warmly welcome) to visit 10 to 15 sites in Crete which represent the most dramatic phase of the collapse and in my opinion represent the phenomenon very relevant to the decades lasting discussions on the 1200 BC collapse in Cyprus and the Levant. The tour may be a bit tiring, the roads end sometimes far from the target and the slopes can be steep occasionally, but that seems to be a much better way of sorting our academic disagreements, than this forum can (by they way, this is my third attempt to send this reply! and I am not sure if this will be published?).
That is almost all of my comments... there is only one point to add, I wish to everyone, including narrow-minded archaeological evidence "collectors", "historical" interpreters and theoretical high flyers a Very Happy New Year.

Totally agree, however

Totally agree, however archaeology itself is rife with dogmatic theories

First, I applaud Knapp &

First, I applaud Knapp & Manning's use of this forum to call attention to an archaeological and historical problem that has particular relevance to our own times. I agree with the authors that this is a complex problem, based in human agency, that calls out for collaboration. As they point out, this is difficult in an arena where “alternative views are intensely criticized, dismissed, or ignored entirely…” (p. 101). Given that apt admission, I expected to see at least a minimal engagement with a thesis I’ve developed since 2000 in which traders play a transformative role in both the rise and demise of the Late Bronze Age. Instead my work is dismissed in footnote 311 as somehow relating to the emergence of freelance trading in the early Iron Age. Sorry, but not that’s pretty far from the mark, and it begs the question of how other authors’ views might be treated here. What’s more surprising is how Knapp & Manning’s conclusions, after considering much of the same documentary evidence (and more of the archaeological) as I did, strongly agree with my own. In calling attention to the human factor, they conclude that “Despite what appear to be the intimate economic interconnections of these polities, when troubles arose beyond the extent of their influence or control, they were unable to present a unite front and so to respond effectively against any perceived enemy or catastrophe.” They go on to emphasize “largely seaborne nature of most episodes” (p. 137).
A few of my own conclusions follow, and I would contextualize these excerpts by adding that my emphasis was on how entrepreneurial traders, especially seafaring merchants, helped create the crisis.
“A transformation model can incorporate not only all these internal and external forces but demonstrate how capitalist enterprise, including long-distance trade, transformed modes of exchange, production, and consumption in a way this inter-societal network was not prepared to manage. In simplest terms the interregional economy became unstable because of increasing dependencies on bronze and other prestige goods that the core powers tried to control but could not [a seven-factor analysis follows] (Monroe 2009: 292);
“The LBII–III period is exceptional in the treaties, laws, diplomacy, and exchange that created the first great international era in world history. But it was a trial outing, created ad hoc by expansion-minded kings and opportunistic entrepreneurs. No one was looking at the big socioeconomic picture or cared much about the fate of the marginalized peoples involved. The violent destruction of the Late Bronze palatial civilization, as attested in the textual and archaeological record, was, like many collapses, the inevitable result of limited foresight”(Monroe 2009:295).
Those quotes come from the lengthy analysis in my 2009 Scales of Fate... , which was pared down in 2015 to a chapter in T. Howe’s edition, Traders in the Ancient World, where similar conclusions about the transformation and collapse are stated in these terms:
“With increasing aridity and access to grain becoming more critical, the effects of a violent migration like the Sea Peoples multiplied into interregional collapse of an interdependent elite or palatial system. As a multi-centered world system, the Eastern Mediterranean had no central means of coping with any of these negative processes; in mythical terms, LBA capitalism was a bit Polyphemic—powerful, yes, but withdrawn and lacking much depth perception” (Monroe 2015: 42). “The heterarchical nature of maritime trade in particular has been underestimated. Not simply the province of kings and their royal fleets, it drew land empires into relations of dependency and currency organized by experts inhabiting the liminal world of shorelines. In a material sense the sea trader entangled everyone, not only in the chrematic, commodifying web of silver but the deep, dark blue of the Mediterranean and its myriad alien shores. All it carried—wealth, information, invasion—would have arrived like the waves of nature’s most creative, chaotic element. The person who could manage that force, through material and immaterial means, was a more powerful agent than hegemony or history has apprehended (Monroe 2015:46).
I could not agree more with the attention to the maritime sphere that Knapp & Manning call for. Besides the dissertation and book-length treatments referenced above, which are highly maritime in focus, I also offered an alternative perspective in ‘From Luxuries to Anxieties…’ (2011) that sought to understand the socioeconomic conditions and transformative power of liminal agents like seafaring merchants; it had very little to do with the supposedly entrepreneurial Iron Age following the crisis.
In closing this long self-serving comment, I have to ask, how can “we identify the protagonists of the crisis and related events” in the Late Bronze Age, if we can’t even identify those we agree with in the present?

Every point that Chris Monroe

Every point that Chris Monroe makes in his reply is valid, and we regret deeply our oversight with respect to his valuable and, in our view, entirely valid analysis of one aspect of the complex situation at the of the Late Bronze Age in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. It is impossible in a study such as ours to do justice to everyone’s work, but that is a poor excuse. Including his engaging and, indeed, enlightening analysis would have enriched our own discussion immensely. We made the decision to focus our brief discussion on this topic around the text of Broodbank’s 2013 Making of the Middle Sea, which, when we were writing, offered a new, fairly radical and deliberately controversial interpretation. However, we agree with Monroe that merchants and traders appear to have played a key and transformative role in the developments we attempted to summarize for the Late Bronze Age and we endorse his views overall. As Monroe states, we and he end up arguing for largely similar conclusions, and we can only apologize for overlooking his very perceptive analyses and thank him for highlighting his work, not least in demonstrating that it goes even further in strengthening the points we tried to make about the human dimensions of the ‘collapse’. Readers will benefit from careful consideration of Monroe’s work, which we should have prioritized in a more appropriate manner. At the same time, we have to accept that there are many topics we had to treat only partially or very briefly in a study that attempted to cover such a large and multi-faceted topic. We value Monroe’s intellectual input and how he has very helpfully pointed to an area where we could have expanded the debate: we retrospectively recommend Monroe’s 2015 paper and the earlier work he cites (2009) to all AJA readers.

Greatly appreciated! Knapp &

Greatly appreciated! Knapp & Manning's invaluable synthesis highlights two aspects of this period: the myriad of contributors to the discussion is impossible to stay on top of, and despite my comment earlier, nobody should be expected to cite every voice; secondly, a key challenge going forward will be extracting higher resolution data, not only chronological, but by determining where the balance of causality lies among all the factors that have been identified in the unmistakable crisis. It's a fascinating study, or could be, in the transformative interplay and interpenetration between the material and human spheres. Kudos to Eric Cline also for getting the outlines of this problem into wider readership.

I found this to be a very

I found this to be a very peculiar article, which had aspects I liked and aspects I disliked. A large part of it was very weighted to discussing the C14 evidence, which seemed fine. I am not in a position to comment on Sturt Manning's erudition and expertise. From there I felt the article then, lapsed into occasional circular argumentation: pots don't equal people (so far so good,most contemporary archaeologists would agree with this). The question then becomes what do the pots mean: emulation, appropriation, entanglement, a de-tethering of potters from palatial workshops who are seeing new patrons. The article doesn't really address what the pots mean, but what they don't mean. Disproving the existence of the Sea Peoples (regardless of what they hear or called themselves) using Dickinson, Guy Middleton, Cyprian Broodbank, and Susan Sherratt, who don't believe in the SP to discredit the idea of the SP if fairly meaningless. I found Knapp and Manning's deconstruction of the Ugaritic and Akkadian texts compelling, really adding something to to the discussion. But they say that there is no evidence for migration, then they assert migration must have taken place, with no model or argumentation for how this would happen. Is it a big one like Assaf argues for or a very limited one as Maeir and I argue for. The article calls for more particularism in studying the region, then they fall back on pottery evidence - mostly Jung's work - even though they assert early on that pots don't equal people, thus more circularity. They rarely discuss what other types of evidence might represent migration, paying lip service to architecture, hearths, etc, but provide no specificity. It's not really clear shat sea peplos's architecture should look like despite now quite a few studies. The authors seem to cherry pick quotations by people people like Maran, Assaf Yasur-Landau & Deger Jalkotzy (who all believe in the Sea People migration [and Assaf is a big proponent for migration]) to help "prove " the SP didn't exist. I understand that this is a big topic, but it doesn't seem to bolster the argument. I was very flattered that they prominently quoted my article with Aren Maeir, but they fall back into simple binarisms of cause and symptom - but these are mutually re-enforcing. They don't really address the specifics of the article. Then they finish up as Eric Cline noted reaching similar conclusions to 1177 (which might really be 1188 - although Eric himself notes the irony of his title). Of course Eric's book was labelled as popular - does that make this work "unpopular". There is a lot of binary thinking in the article, and while it acknowledges changes, there isn't much serious attempt to explain them (except the dates). I found myself wondering who reviewed this. I completely agree with Nowicki's plea to look at settlement patterns, which change drastically. Unfortunately Karageorghis (in the latest Pyla reports) still privileges the notion that the settlers were Aegean refugees, certainly privileging the Aegean evidence and downplaying Canaanite and Cypriot evidence. So, more particularism is in order....

All replies to the comments

All replies to the comments of our article on this Forum come from Knapp AND Manning. AJA’s online system only recognizes the person who sends the comment or reply. More to that: is there any reason why we need THREE copies of the same reply from Nowicki?
Nowicki’s latest reply repeats at much greater length his original complaint, and in the process deems it fit to criticize, in a long soliloquy, Dickinson’s (2006) questioning of and critical views on his own (i.e. Nowicki’s) work. We can acknowledge, at least, that we seem to have short-changed Crete, but can only reply that we still await a (simple, i.e. brief) explanation of how settlement patterns on Crete at the end of the LBA affected Cyprus or the rest of the east Mediterranean (the focus of our paper). We accept, but did not discuss beyond a sentence and some references, that there were some major settlement changes on Crete in the period from the end of the LBA to the early Iron Age. We regard these as largely occurring within a sociopolitical framework, while accepting some possible relevance at least of (changing) climate context as suggested for this case (and cited by us) by Moody 2005. And we would agree with Wallace (e.g. 2000 in Aegean Archaeology 4: 61-99) that we need to envisage a much more complex scenario than that argued by Nowicki. We note that the numerous but nearly all extremely small and mainly inland ‘defensive/defensible’ sites noted by Nowicki (e.g. Wallace 2000: fig.15) would offer an interesting issue for the long-term settlement history (etc.) of Crete, but we do not see how they are actually directly relevant — as to cause, versus a secondary result, perhaps — to the rather different situation in the eastern Mediterranean, nor to the issues of connectivity and associated transformative processes that seem to be a key point. The rest of Nowicki’s reply goes round in circles about his opinion vs. ours (or Dickinson’s), and the reader can make of that whatever s/he wishes.

Hitchcock, to continue the discussion, agrees with Nowicki’s plea to look at settlement patterns, ‘which change drastically’: is she agreeing about Cretan settlement patterns? Or all relevant settlement patterns? If the total observation she is adding is that settlements patterns changed drastically (we never said they did not), then we are still in the dark about how that relates in any way to our article. She insists that we should, but have not, made a coherent case about migrations, but we were not writing about migrations except in one small part of this study. And because we disagree with her about the ‘size’ of a migrating group, we are chastised for not providing a ‘model’ or ‘argumentation’ about how it might have happened. It’s hard to win here…. Finally, we cannot understand her comments about circular arguments vis-à-vis pottery, nor about ‘simple binarisms of cause and effect’ that are ‘mutually reinforcing’ (???), which are then extrapolated to the entire paper. We are afraid this is another example of what one referee ‘warned’ us about: namely that various specialists will find fault with one part of the paper or another, which when combined may conspire to form reactionary responses that tread along a single line of argument. A narrow view on migration will never enlighten the larger topic that we were attempting to discuss, and Manning’s ‘expert’ and ‘erudite’ discussion of BOTH chronological and climatological evidence is tied directly into the larger argument.

I can only apologize for

I can only apologize for posting my previous reply three times (I did it in long intervals when I saw that they were not published) - I expected some human being in control of the process, but I was apparently wrong. All has been done by "technology" itself, without any intervention of a living brain, I guess. I am glad to see that our opinions (mine and the authors') have moved closer to each other on the very issue of the role of regional settlement changes analysis for the reconstruction of wide-scale complex processes. However, there is still some gap in our understanding how settlement changes can be used for the better interpretation of past people's history, and how the changes in neighbouring regions can be read together to find the answers to common questions? So, now only a few remarks to clarify a few points made by the Authors. I do accept the Author's complain about the need of "a simple, i.e. brief" explanation "how settlements settlement patterns on Crete at the end of the LBA affected Cyprus or the rest of the east Mediterranean". I will try to propose such a more thorough explanation (though it want be very brief, I am afraid) on the links between the changes in the south Aegean and Cyprus in one of my future works. However, I did not suggest that the changes of settlement patterns in Crete themselves affected Cyprus, I did suggest that they should be analysed together with the changes in Cyprus because they represent different parts of the same process/es which affected a large part of the East Mediterranean. Once again, the changes identified in Crete do not explain the reasons for the 1200 BC crisis and collapse, but their understanding may help to explain the character of events/ processes observed in this time at least between the Aegean and the Levant. And that is directly relevant to the problem discussed in the Knapp and Manning's paper.
The second point made by the authors: "And we would agree with Wallace (e.g. 2000 in Aegean Archaeology 4: 61-99) that we need to envisage a much more complex scenario than that argued by Nowicki. We note that the numerous but nearly all extremely small and mainly inland ‘defensive/defensible’ sites noted by Nowicki". This is especially important point for the understanding of the plausible scenario of the 1200 BC crisis and collapse. When using some references, such as above, we should be aware of all the details involved in the quoted discussion. The changes observed in Crete at the end of the Bronze Age and during the Early Iron Age (and critically analysed by Wallace) were indeed complex, but their complexity was also connected with the length of time we both analysed, about four to five hundred years, which can be divided into at least five phases. All these phases show not only changes in individual settlements' locations and settlement patterns, but also the complexity of people responses to the variety of changes in their lives (starting with settlement topography and landscape and ending with economy, social organization and political development). What was going on in Crete, however, after 1150 BC is less relevant to the subject of Knapp and Manning's paper, that is why I do not suggest to get involved in the discussion concerning all the aspects of the changes throughout all those five or four centuries, but I would like to stress, instead, the importance of the first two phases, namely 1) the last two or three decades of the thirteenth century and 2) the first three to five decades of the twelfth century BC. These changes only are directly relevant to the subject. therefore, it is not true that the new sites of these periods were small and inland. Many were coastal and large (in the Cretan scale). In my previous comment I mentioned these sites by names, so there is no need to repeat them again. Among the most interesting observations concerning those and other similar sites, not only in Crete, but also on the other South Aegean islands is the variety of the local inhabitants' response to the collapse of the security system, their active involvement in the creation of this insecurity, or opposite, their passive adaptation to it, the interaction between different groups of people, possibility of migrants from within and from outside, temporarity of new settlements, the connection between the location and defensive structures with a hypothetical reconstruction of social organization, differences in changes along the southern and northern coast of Crete, different fate of settlements within the period in question, and many others. All this can, and I think is, relevant to the subject discussed in Knapp and Manning' interesting article.

Anyway all those discussion

Anyway all those discussion and debates are very interesting for a non specialist. First because I learn a lot. Second because it is intrestiing as Clint did, to use the intellectual framework to analyse the present situation.

The End of the Late Bronze Age in the Eastern Mediterranean

The main paragraph from the abstract:
“The ambiguity of the evidence—material, textual, climatic, chronological—and the differing contexts involved across the central-eastern Mediterranean make it difficult to disentangle background noise from boundary conditions and to distinguish cause from effect. Can we identify the protagonists of the crisis and related events?”

Yes we can

See “The Sea Peoples and the Historical Background of the Trojan War” in https://www.jstor.org/stable/24668030

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Crisis in Context: The End of the Late Bronze Age in the Eastern Mediterranean

Crisis in Context: The End of the Late Bronze Age in the Eastern Mediterranean

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